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Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional Conditions
LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER
This Article proposes a new constitutional framework for approaching
the issue of speech-related conditions on government funding accepted by
nonprofits and demonstrates its application by reviewing the Court’s
landmark decisions in this area. It argues that speech rights are generally
inalienable as against the government under the First Amendment, and
therefore any abridgement of such rights by the government—whether
direct or indirect—is subject to strict scrutiny. As a result, the government
is not permitted to buy an organization’s speech absent a compelling
governmental interest in doing so and then only if the purchase is done in a
manner that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
This Article’s approach contrasts with the current approach of the
Supreme Court in this area, which in its various attempts to resolve
disputes centering on such conditions has left courts, governments, and
private parties understandably confused about the applicable
constitutional standards. This tendency is illustrated in particular by the
Court’s recent Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open
Society International opinion. This framework also has two broader
ramifications. First, it may prove useful for resolving constitutional
disputes relating to other speech-related conditions, such as campaign
finance limits tied to government funding or other government benefits.
Second, it demonstrates that by drawing on the extensive unconstitutional
conditions literature to create an approach customized to a particular
constitutional context it may be possible to salvage the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine even given its widely acknowledged incoherence.
Salvaging the doctrine is particularly important in a world where
government benefits both permeate almost every type of activity and are
often accompanied by constitutionally suspect restrictions.
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Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional Conditions
LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER*
I. INTRODUCTION
If there is any consensus with respect to the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, it is that the doctrine is a mess both generally
and in the specific constitutional contexts in which the courts have applied
it.1 While some of the most prominent legal scholars have attempted to
bring coherence to the doctrine,2 others have concluded that coherence is
unachievable.3 Yet, at the same time, the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts continue to apply the doctrine to a wide variety of
circumstances.4
*
Professor and Associate Dean, Notre Dame Law School. I am very grateful to Ellen Aprill,
Amy Barrett, Miriam Galston, Rick Garnett, and Randy Kozel for comments and to Joseph Ganahl,
Daniel Herbster, and Holly LaCount for research assistance.
1
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1995) (“[The] larger
portions of the area . . . cannot be theoretically rationalized.”); Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial
Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the
Lesser,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 693, 763 (2002) (“Existing commercial speech doctrine is a mess.”); Daniel
A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 913, 951 (2006) (“A clear view of the unconstitutional conditions quagmire reveals a
messy scene . . . .”).
2
See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 6 (2001) (attempting to effectuate a compromise with regards to
unconstitutional conditions); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court—1987 Term: Foreword,
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1988)
(showing the functionality of unconstitutional conditions in various contexts); Farber, supra note 1, at
915 (clarifying the problem of unconstitutional conditions by viewing constitutional rights like a
contract default); Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A
Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 380 (1995) (articulating a more easily applicable
conception of the doctrine); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1506 (1989) (providing a better depiction of the doctrine).
3
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 990 (1995) (“[T]he problem of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is . . . an intractable problem.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion),
70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 608 (1990) (arguing for the abandonment of the doctrine because of its
ineffectiveness).
4
See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595–97 (2013)
(applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to a state’s decision to deny a permit based on a
private party’s refusal to turn over property to the government); Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for
Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328–30 (2013) (applying the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to a speech-related condition on federal funding); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566, 2603–04 (2012) (applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the withholding of all
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This Article is not another attempt to bring clarity to the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine across the entire constitutional
landscape.5 It instead has the more modest but also more achievable goal
of bringing clarity to a particular place within that landscape on which the
Supreme Court has focused repeatedly, most recently this past term in
Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society
International (“Alliance”).6 That place is speech-related conditions on
government-provided benefits to nonprofit organizations.
There are several reasons to focus on this particular part of the legal
terrain. First, this area has and is likely to continue to see significant
conflict. Nonprofits both tend to seek government benefits and desire to
speak freely about controversial issues, as illustrated by a series of disputes
that have reached the Supreme Court.7 Second, how the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine applies to such conflicts remains highly uncertain. For
example, in Alliance, the nonprofits prevailed at the appellate court level,
but the judges split two-to-one, with both sides claiming that their position
was clearly correct based on existing unconstitutional conditions
precedent.8 While such claims are in part a rhetorical device, the fact that
both sides could plausibly make them illustrates the current confusion
regarding the doctrine’s application in this context. While the Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision by a vote of six to two
(Justice Kagan recused, presumably because she had been involved with
the case as Solicitor General),9 for reasons that will be detailed in this
Article, the majority’s reasoning did little to help clarify the constitutional
standards in this area. In fact, the majority’s subtle recharacterization of
the Court’s previous decisions likely has actually created more uncertainty.
federal Medicaid funding if a state did not agree to accept expanded Medicaid coverage and related
conditions).
5
The breadth of the landscape can be seen in the many contexts in which the federal courts have
applied the doctrine. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 4 (listing applications of the doctrine ranging
from state incorporation powers to public roads to employment cases to tax exemptions); Jason
Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 807 (2003) (listing a multitude of conditions
that the Supreme Court has found to be unconstitutional).
6
133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
7
Besides the most recent case, the Supreme Court also squarely addressed this issue in Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (abortion), FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)
(noncommercial, educational broadcasting), and Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,
461 U.S. 540 (1983) (federal taxation).
8
See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 234 (2d Cir.
2011) (“[W]e conclude that the Policy Requirement, as implemented by the Agencies, falls well beyond
what the Supreme Court and this Court have upheld as permissible funding conditions.” (emphasis
added)); id. at 240 (Straub, J., dissenting) (“On the contrary, the Policy Requirement, together with the
Guidelines implemented by Defendants, is precisely in line with the ‘unconstitutional conditions’
doctrine as it has been applied in the context of subsidy conditions alleged to violate the First
Amendment.” (emphasis added)).
9
Alliance,133 S. Ct. at 2321.
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Third, the approach developed in this limited area may have
application to other, related disputes, such as challenges to conditions
limiting the election-related speech of for-profit corporations receiving
certain government benefits (a particularly contentious area in the wake of
Citizens United).10 That possibility in turn suggests a different way to
approach the unconstitutional conditions doctrine more generally. Rather
than attempting to develop a universal theory or approach for the doctrine,
it may be more productive to instead develop a specific framework for
applying the doctrine in a given constitutional context and then to extend
that framework only to other, related disputes on an incremental basis.
Given the pervasiveness of government benefits and therefore the risk to
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms if there is not a robust
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, it is critical that a way be found to
salvage the doctrine whenever possible.11
Part II focuses on the issue of speech-related conditions on
government-provided benefits to nonprofit organizations, developing a
new framework for applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in
this particular First Amendment context. This framework is based on the
conclusion that speech rights are generally inalienable as against the
government under the First Amendment, and therefore any abridgement of
such rights by the government—whether direct or indirect—is subject to
strict scrutiny. As a result, the government is not permitted to buy an
organization’s speech absent a compelling governmental interest in doing
so and then only if the purchase is done in a manner that is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.
Part III contrasts this framework with the shifting approaches taken by
the Supreme Court in resolving three unconditional conditions disputes in
this area, including Alliance. Part IV then considers broader ramifications
of this approach, including the framework’s possible application to speechrelated conditions on benefits received by for-profit entities, such as
restrictions on election-related speech by government contractors, and
whether this customized and incremental approach to developing the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine might provide a better way of
clarifying the doctrine in other contexts.
II. RETHINKING SPEECH AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
The vast majority of nonprofits depend significantly on government
benefits in a variety of forms. Besides the well-known benefits of
10

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1419 (“[The] unconstitutional conditions doctrine performs an
important function. It identifies a characteristic technique by which government appears not to, but in
fact does burden . . . liberties . . . .”).
11
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exemption from federal income tax and the ability to receive tax deductible
contributions, nonprofits, especially charitable, educational, religious, and
similar organizations, enjoy a host of other government-provided
benefits.12 In addition, many nonprofits receive substantial government
financial support in the form of grants, contracts, and payments to benefit
individuals, such as through the Medicare and Medicaid systems.13 Not
surprisingly, these benefits often come with numerous strings attached,
including speech-related conditions.14
At the same time, many nonprofits consider it a fundamental part of
their mission to communicate certain values, messages, or public policy
positions to others. Such communications can and often have run afoul of
the speech-related conditions on the government benefits they enjoy. The
recent Alliance case illustrates this conflict. At issue in that case was a
provision of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (“the Act”) that barred funding
under the Act for any group or organization “that does not have a policy
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”15 To enforce this
prohibition, the implementing agencies required the recipients of funding
under the Act to document their opposition to prostitution and sex
trafficking.16 The agencies also established guidelines requiring sufficient
separation from any affiliated entities that did not comply with this
requirement, with the sufficiency of such separation determined by not
only the extent of legal and financial separation but also the extent to
which the organizations maintained separate personnel and physical
facilities.17 While the affected nonprofits could have chosen either to
refuse the funding or accept the speech-related condition, they chose a
third option: to challenge the condition as unconstitutional. This Part
develops a new framework for resolving such disputes that is on more solid
constitutional footing than the various approaches the Supreme Court has
12
See Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28
U.S.F. L. REV. 85, 85–86 (1993) (summarizing benefits charities receive from federal, state, and local
governments); Memorandum from Erika Lunder, Legislative Att’y, Cong. Research Serv., to Joint
Comm. on Taxation (Feb. 16, 2005) (summarizing statutes of the federal government and five states
that confer legal benefits on to charities).
13
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-193, NONPROFIT SECTOR:
SIGNIFICANT FEDERAL FUNDS REACH THE SECTOR THROUGH VARIOUS MECHANISMS, BUT MORE
COMPLETE AND RELIABLE FUNDING DATA ARE NEEDED (2009) (describing and attempting to quantify
the flow of federal funds to nonprofit organizations).
14
See Steven Rathgeb Smith, Government Financing of Nonprofit Activity, in NONPROFITS &
GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION & CONFLICT 219, 234–36 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle
eds., 2d ed. 2006) (describing strings that may be attached to the government benefits received by nonprofits).
15
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (2013)
(quoting 22 U.S.C. § 763(f) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16
Id. at 2326.
17
Id. at 2326–27.
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taken to date.
A. The Inalienability of the Constitutional Right to Free Speech
Kathleen Sullivan’s landmark article provides perhaps the most quoted
definition of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which states that the
doctrine “reflects the triumph of the view that government may not do
indirectly what it may not do directly.”18 More specifically, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is implicated in the following situation: “[The
g]overnment offers a benefit that it is constitutionally permitted but not
compelled to offer, on condition that the recipient undertake (or refrain
from) future action that is legal for him to undertake (or to refrain from)
but that government could not have constitutionally compelled (or
prohibited) without especially strong justification.”19 That is, the doctrine
applies when the government provides a constitutionally permitted but
optional benefit conditioned on the recipient giving up a constitutionally
protected right.20 Of course, it may not always be clear whether a given
benefit is optional or whether a given condition actually infringes on a
constitutionally protected right. Fortunately, in the context of allegedly
speech-related conditions on government funding, it is usually clear
whether the benefit is optional on the part of the government and also
whether the condition is in fact speech-related.21 For purposes of this
Article, it will, therefore, be assumed that it can be readily determined
whether these threshold conditions for application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine exist.
Even if the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is implicated, that does
not automatically mean the condition is in fact unconstitutional. Whether
the condition at issue is unconstitutional is the key question that the
doctrine attempts to answer, but often with limited success for several
reasons. A threshold problem is determining the extent to which
constitutional rights generally, or certain constitutional rights specifically,
are alienable with respect to the government that is, can be traded with
the government by the individual or entity enjoying them.22 The role of the
18

Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1415.
Id. at 1427.
20
See Epstein, supra note 2, at 7 (“The problem of unconstitutional conditions arises whenever a
government seeks to achieve its desired result by obtaining bargained-for consent of the party whose
conduct is to be restricted.”).
21
For an example of a situation where the Supreme Court found an allegedly speech-related
condition that did not implicate the First Amendment, see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65, 66, 69–70 (2006).
22
See Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, Rights for Sale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 90, 92 (2011) (indicating
the idea for a “detailed framework of . . . intermediate alienability techniques” and the “modularity of
alienability”); Farber, supra note 1, at 914 (“Despite the Declaration of Independence’s proclamation of
inalienable rights, constitutional rights are indeed alienable in the sense that they can be waived in
19
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government as the other party is important, because usually part of having
a right is the ability to choose how to exercise that right, including
exercising the right in a way that another party who has paid the holder of
the right directs or even foregoing to exercise the right at all in exchange
for some type of consideration.23 Simply because a right holder should
generally be able to bargain away that right does not mean, however, that
she should be permitted to do so when the other party is the government.24
This limitation is of particular concern because constitutional rights for
individuals are generally designed not to limit the dealings of private
parties, including with respect to influencing others to exercise a right in a
certain way or not to exercise a right at all, but instead to limit the actions
of government.25 Alienability, therefore, gets to the key issue of whether
government can do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
That said, clearly some rights are currently tradable even with the
government. For example, a criminal defendant can trade (although
generally subject to court approval) her Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial in exchange for a plea bargain that guarantees conviction only for a
lesser crime or provides for a lighter sentence than might otherwise apply
if the defendant was convicted as a result of such a trial, although this
practice is not exempt from criticism.26 Indeed, for some rights the
return for various benefits.” (footnote omitted)); Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good for, 93
VA. L. REV. 1663, 1701 (2007) (“Waivability of constitutional protections is the constitutional
default . . . .”); Mazzone, supra note 5, at 801–02 (discussing unconstitutional conditions and the
alienability of constitutional rights in relation to criminal proceedings).
23
See William T. Mayton, “Buying-Up Speech”: Active Government and the Terms of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 373, 380 (1994) (stating that in general “a
right is customarily justified by principles of personal autonomy and dignity” and “[a]n implication of
this autonomy in rights is that they are alienable”); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1486 (noting that making
constitutional rights inalienable effectively creates duties).
24
See Epstein, supra note 2, at 22 (stating that in some areas up for bargaining, the government
has a permanent monopoly and it must be neutralized to constrain the government and give citizens a
more level playing field); Steven G. Gey, Contracting Away Rights: A Comment on Daniel Farber’s
“Another View of the Quagmire,” 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 953, 954 (noting the idea that an individual
can bargain his or her rights away “misconstrues the structural nature of constitutional rights in our
system of limited government”).
25
See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA.
L. REV. 479, 484 (2012) (noting that constitutional rights “are framed as limits on government”);
T. Hunter Jefferson, Note, Constitutional Wrongs and Common Law Principles: The Case for the
Recognition of State Constitutional Tort Actions Against State Governments, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1525,
1559 (1997) (“[C]onstitutional rights are specifically designed to limit the actions of the government
and its agents.”).
26
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 744 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea could not be
rejected as coercive just because the defendant received a benefit in exchange for waiving his right to
trial); Ana Maria Gutierrez, The Sixth Amendment: The Operation of Plea Bargaining in Contemporary
Criminal Procedure, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 695, 696–97, 706 (2010) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment
rights and the process of waiving those rights are not clear, leading to confusion during the plea bargain
process); Tina Wan, Note, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional Conditions
Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 33, 34 (2007)
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Constitution explicitly provides for such possible trades. For example, the
Third Amendment permits the quartering of soldiers in a house in time of
peace with “the consent of the owner,”27 strongly implying that the
government could buy this consent.28 At the same time, some rights may
not be tradable to the government because the government is never
permitted, under the Constitution, to engage in the activity at issue. An
example of this situation may be the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment even if a criminal agrees to it.29
As a threshold matter, whether an institution, as opposed to an
individual, has a right to free speech under the Constitution is itself a
controversial issue in at least some contexts.30 One need not accept the
Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United that the source of speech is
irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the speech itself is
protected by the First Amendment, however.31 Especially for nonprofit
organizations engaged in advocacy activities, there is a very strong
argument that even if First Amendment speech protection is limited to
individuals, such organizations should also enjoy this protection because
their speech reflects the speech-related desires of the individuals affiliated
(stating that in plea bargain situations, the “state is essentially penalizing those defendants who choose
to exercise their constitutional rights”).
27
U.S. CONST. amend. III.
28
The Third Amendment is rarely invoked in present day litigation, although parties in a recent
federal lawsuit raised it as part of a claim arising from the police arresting a family after the family
refused to let officers use their homes as a lookout post for a domestic violence investigation. Megan
Gallegos, Police Commandeer Homes, Get Sued, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 3, 2013),
https://www.courthousenews.com/2013/07/03/59061.htm; see also Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L.
Stroup, Quartering Species: The “Living Constitution,” the Third Amendment, and the Endangered
Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769, 798–99, 804 (2000) (suggesting that the Third Amendment could be
applied to the quartering of endangered species and that the government would need to purchase or
compensate the owner for quartering the endangered animals); Geoffrey M. Wyatt, The Third
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Military Recruiting on Private Campuses, 40 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 113, 158 (2005) (“The [Third] [A]mendment requires consent expressly, and therefore it is a
dubious proposition that the government may presume consent simply because someone accepts
‘gratuitous’ federal benefits.”); James P. Rogers, Note, Third Amendment Protections in Domestic
Disasters, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 747, 759–63, 774 (2008) (arguing that violations of the Third
Amendment occur today without people knowing their rights or that consent is needed).
29
See Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections on Lawyers’ Ethics and Death Row Volunteers,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 806–08 (2002) (raising this point in the context of capital punishment).
30
See, e.g., Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 765, 767, 779–805 (2013) (discussing the sharp disagreements within the Supreme Court in
Citizens United on whether “corporations are entitled to the same First Amendment protection as
natural persons”); Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate
Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575, 577–80 (2012) (discussing criticisms of the Citizens United
decision).
31
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 349, 353 (2010) (indicating that
the identity of the speaker, whether a corporation or an individual, does not make the speech more or
less valuable, and that “[a]t the founding . . . there were no limits on the sources of speech and
knowledge”).
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32

with such groups.
But regardless of the basis for extending First
Amendment speech protection to nonprofits, for purposes of this Article,
extension will be assumed (as it has apparently been by the Supreme Court
well before the Citizens United decision33).
The key question to consider is therefore whether the particular
constitutional right at issue here, the First Amendment right to free speech,
is one that nonprofits as assumed holders of that right can trade to the
government in exchange for a benefit. While in some constitutional
contexts it may be very difficult to determine a clear answer to this
question, for the reasons detailed below, that is not the case here.
The first place to start answering this question is with the text and
history of the First Amendment.34 In relevant part, it provides “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”35 On its face, the
language does not suggest an ability on the part of the speaker to bargain
this right away to the government unlike, for example, the Third
Amendment.36 At the same time, however, the language does not clearly
prohibit such bargaining. While the term “abridging” could be interpreted
as including laws that offer a speaker a benefit in return for waiving their
freedom of speech in some respect or another, that interpretation is not
necessarily correct.37 The history of the First Amendment is also unclear
on this point.38
32
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens
United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407, 418–19 (2011) (arguing that “the level of protection for institutional
speech would depend on the strength of the speech’s connection to the desires of individuals affiliated
with that institution,” including nonprofit corporations).
33
See infra Part III (discussing the relevant Supreme Court decisions).
34
See, e.g., Gey, supra note 24, at 955–57 (providing an analysis in determining the alienability
of constitutional rights by examining the Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments as examples).
35
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37
See Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569,
577 (1998) (“The constitutional text is assuredly as susceptible of one meaning as of the other . . . what
constitutes a ‘law abridging the freedom of speech’ is either a matter of history or else it is a matter of
opinion.” (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 688 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))); Marin R. Scordato, The Elusive Paradigm of the Press, 72 B.U. L. REV. 673, 673 (1992)
(reviewing LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS (1991)) (arguing that the complexity of the
meaning of “abridging” is not natural, but instead is created because if the natural meaning of it was
accepted, constitutional protection would be too broad); Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 231, 248 (2011) (stating that the meaning of the First
Amendment today has changed from what was asserted as the meaning by the ratifiers of the
Constitution).
38
See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits
of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1291–96 (1998) (arguing, contrary to some legal
historians, that freedom of speech was understood at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights as an
inalienable natural right, and concluding that “this makes it difficult to attribute any precise original
meaning to the First Amendment”); Rodney A. Smolla, Content and Context: The Contributions of
William Van Alstyne to First Amendment Interpretation, 54 DUKE L.J. 1623, 1633–34 (2005)
(recognizing that “what history seems to make of the First Amendment is that the Amendment did not
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Given the lack of clarity from either text or history, most
commentators have looked instead to two related issues—the purpose of
this constitutional right and whether that right is solely held by the speaker
or also, at least in part, by the potential hearers of the speech.39 While
stated in various ways, the purpose is generally found to be to protect
freedom of all types.40 For example, the Supreme Court has stated that
freedom of speech “safeguards a freedom which is the ‘matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.’”41 That
purpose strongly suggests there is a public interest in preventing a speaker
from trading away this freedom, particularly when the other party at the
table is the State.42
Relying on similar reasons, the ability of the speaker to trade away
their freedom of speech is often questioned on the grounds that other
parties—namely the potential hearers of the speech—are not also at the

mean much,” and arguing further that the restriction of “abridging the freedom of speech” was thought
initially to only apply to Congress); see also Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment
Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1080, 1091 (1991) (suggesting that James Madison and Roger
Sherman viewed freedom of speech as an alienable natural right, but even if freedom of speech is an
alienable natural right, Congress may only infringe on that right if it provides equivalent greater
security and safety for individuals and society in exchange). But see Mayton, supra note 23, at 390–91
(arguing that the text and history of the First Amendment demonstrate that freedom of speech was
viewed as a common good and is, therefore, inalienable as against the government). Note that even if
freedom of speech is an alienable natural right, meaning that the people may choose to surrender some
aspect of that right as part of enacting a constitution, it may be an inalienable constitutional right to the
extent it is provided for in that constitution, i.e., the right may only be alienable by the people acting
collectively, not by each citizen or entity acting individually).
39
See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (upholding First Amendment
right to receive mailings from foreign governments); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1387 (1984) (“But many
constitutional rights protect other values or protect individual choice only as a means to the realization
of other ends. For such rights, there is no paradox in asserting that the choice of the individual should
not decide the applicability of the right in question.”); Burt Neuborne, Taking Hearers Seriously, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1425, 1434–35 (2013) (reviewing TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012)) (noting that hearers have an
independent right to receive information, and thus have a constitutional right as a hearer rather than
only as a speaker).
40
See, e.g., Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 987
(2011) (“The First Amendment protects all those individuals and groups that would exercise their right
to speak and communicate by disabling government from abridging the freedom of speech.”).
41
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 327 (1937)).
42
See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 261, 356 (1998) (arguing for courts to apply a more stringent standard of review to the waiver
of First Amendment rights “because a waiver of speech rights implicates both the public’s interest as
well as the individual’s interest”); Mayton, supra note 23, at 381 (contending that if the government
can buy-off a speaker, “the community is denied speech, and in this way freedom of speech as a
common good is limited”).
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table. This conclusion is complicated by the fact that generally speakers
are free to surrender their freedom of speech in trades with other private
parties—indeed, that is seen as part of the freedom of speech—and the
State will generally enforce such private bargains.44 Nevertheless, there is
a difference when the other party is the State, because then the other party
is acting pursuant to law enacted by Congress (or a state legislature) and so
the language of the First Amendment is directly implicated in a manner not
true in private-party-only transactions.
Even those commentators who consider essentially all constitutional
rights to be alienable, including with respect to the government,
acknowledge that these last two considerations may render the right to
freedom of speech an inappropriate one for bargaining between the speaker
and government.45 For example, Daniel Farber suggests that perhaps any
condition relating to speech results in an unacceptable level of externalities
because the public has an interest in freedom of speech, not just the
speaker.46 Richard Epstein makes a similar point, although to a more
limited extent, arguing that if a speech-related condition distorts the
political process by favoring some views over others then the condition is

43
See Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55
BROOK. L. REV. 5, 18 (1989) (recognizing the distinction between speaker-centered and hearercentered benefits of free speech and how both are reasons for the protection of the right of free speech).
44
Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1650, 1677–78 (2009) (acknowledging that “[t]he consensual waiver approach [which] views a
person’s consent to the waiver of her First Amendment rights as dispositive for First Amendment
purposes” has “a great deal of merit” but criticizing it both for being underinclusive and for failing to
explain the problem of unconstitutional conditions, i.e., when the government is the party seeking the
waiver); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a
Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2000) (recognizing that
in the context of transactions between private parties, “the free speech right must turn on the rights of
the speakers, and . . . it’s proper to let speakers contract away their rights”).
45
These commentators generally draw on contract law to determine when otherwise alienable
rights should be tradable to the state. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 15–21 (noting that such bargains
should not be permitted when either the state or the individual citizen can misuse the bargain either to
benefit one group of citizens over another (the state) or to benefit himself or herself over all other
citizens because of a monopoly position, collective action problems, or externalities); Farber, supra
note 1, at 934 (arguing that constitutional rights can be viewed as contractual defaults, with departures
from those defaults permitted unless the bargaining process is flawed by monopoly power, transaction
costs, information asymmetries or other information problems, or exclusion of affected third parties,
i.e., externalities); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 349 (discussing circumstances
when permitting an individual to surrender an otherwise alienable constitutional right might be
problematic); Sian E. Provost, Note, A Defense of Rights-Based Approach to Identifying Coercion in
Contract Law, 73 TEX. L. REV. 629, 632–33 (1995) (discussing generally how contracts between
private parties will not be upheld if various forms of coercion are at play such as unequal bargaining
powers, undue influence, economic coercion, or adhesion contracts).
46
Farber, supra note 1, at 935.
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in fact unconstitutional.
The weight of authority and commentary therefore leads to the
conclusion that in general the right of speech, whether speech by
nonprofits or others, is inalienable with respect to the government
regardless of whether one thinks constitutional rights are generally
alienable with respect to the government. This conclusion does not,
however, end the inquiry regarding the application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in this context. Even if the right to freedom of speech
is generally inalienable, there may still be situations when the government
can constitutionally condition a benefit on acceptance of a speech-related
restriction.48 The next Section considers when this may be the case.
B. When Is the Inalienable Constitutional Right to Free Speech Alienable?
Under what circumstances, if any, should the government be able to
condition a benefit on the surrender of an otherwise inalienable
constitutional right?
Kathleen Sullivan argues generally for the
inalienability of constitutional rights with respect to the government, but
she also provides two avenues for governments to constitutionally
condition benefits on the surrender of such rights.49 The first avenue is
when the interference with a constitutional right is only an unintentional
side effect of the benefit program at issue. Sullivan provides the example
of the government restricting food stamps to food purchases, which has the
effect if not the specific intention of preventing the recipients from using
the food stamps to buy contraceptives or a television ad—that is, otherwise
constitutionally protected activities.50 She views this avenue as a relatively
narrow one, however, with close cases falling outside of this exception to
the general rule of inalienability.51
47
Epstein, supra note 2, at 74–79. Some commentators have also identified broader concerns,
such as efficiency, distributional concerns, and the relationship of the right to personal identity, as
possibly being relevant to the question of alienability with respect to the government. E.g., Sullivan,
supra note 2, at 1481–86. Sometimes personal consent is given as a solution to unconstitutional
conditions. But see Hamburger, supra note 25, at 481 (arguing that consent is even more concerning
than the usual unconstitutional condition worries because consent can become itself a threat and it can
create “many more loose ends” without fixing the actual problems).
48
See Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American
Constitutions: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 747, 759 (2001) (arguing that there may be exceptions to the inalienability of constitutional
rights that stem from a historical perspective of what the founders meant to be inalienable rights);
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1501–02 (giving examples of when the government can constitutionally
condition a benefit on acceptance of a speech-related condition). But see Kreimer, supra note 39, at
1386 (making an argument that unless the constitutional right is alienable, it cannot be waived or
surrendered).
49
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1490–501.
50
Id. at 1501.
51
Id. at 1501–02.
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More importantly, Sullivan argues that a “strict review” standard
should apply in all other instances where a government provided benefit
comes with a condition relating to the exercise of a constitutional right.52
In her view, such strict review would require the government to
demonstrate a compelling justification for the condition.53 Interestingly,
however, she does not elaborate explicitly on the extent to which the
benefit/condition arrangement needs to be closely or narrowly tailored to
the asserted compelling justification, although she suggests that an analysis
similar to that found when “strict scrutiny” applies is appropriate.54
Perhaps the most obvious situation where a government benefit can
still be conditioned on surrendering the right to free speech is when the
government is paying the full cost of that speech.55 While the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally reflects the view that the
government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly,56 the opposite
is generally true as well—the government should be able to do indirectly
what it can do directly. By this I mean that if the government is permitted
to say X itself, it follows that the government should be able to pay a
nonprofit or other private party to say X—in other words, the government
has a compelling interest in ensuring that it gets what it pays for.57 This
interest is rooted in the Spending Clause, which explicitly grants Congress
the broad authority to “provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States.”58 At least as long as the government is
paying the entire cost of the speech, the hired party should not be able to
argue that as an exercise of its free speech rights it must be able to use the
52

Id. at 1499–500.
Id. at 1503.
54
Id. at 1506.
55
See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 612 (2008) (analyzing United States v. Rust, where the Court upheld the
government’s regulation of subsidized doctors, thereby preventing them from discussing abortion with
their patients); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983,
983–88 (2005) (providing examples of where the government was able to direct private speech because
the government provided the funding); Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 365, 374–75 (2009) (highlighting that the United States Supreme Court has affirmed the
government’s ability to define the scope and limits of its spending programs, even if it involves
viewpoint-based decisions).
56
See, e.g., Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1217 (11th Cir.
2013) (“[W]hat the state may not do directly it may not do indirectly.” (quoting Bailey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. 219, 244 (1910))).
57
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[W]e have
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.”).
58
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327–28 (2013) (“The [Spending] Clause provides Congress broad discretion to
tax or spend for the ‘general Welfare,’ including by funding particular state or private programs or
activities. That power includes the authority to impose limits on the use of such funds to ensure they
are used in the manner Congress intends.”).
53
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government-provided funds to say Y instead of X. This may in fact be a
better way to approach the previously mentioned exception posited by
Sullivan for unintentional or incidental conditions, such as requiring the
recipient of food stamps to spend those stamps on food and not, for
example, on speech.59 If government is paying the full cost of an activity,
it has the authority to limit the use of its funds even if by doing so it denies
the recipient the ability to use those funds to exercise a constitutional right,
such as speech.
It is important, however, to note three important limitations on this
exception to the inalienability of free speech rights with respect to the
government. First, the government must be paying the full cost of the
speech or other activity at issue; that is, none of the private party’s
financial resources, which otherwise it could use for speech of its
choosing, are being consumed.60 (The next Part will explore situations
where the speech is only partly funded by the government.) Second, the
speech or activity must be one that the government could make or do
directly. For example, the funded activity could not be speech endorsing a
particular religious faith, as such speech would violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.61 Third, the government funding must not
be for the purpose of creating a public forum designed to facilitate a broad
range of private, not government, speech. In that situation, the First
Amendment bars the government from engaging in viewpoint
discrimination, although it may permit content discrimination under some
circumstances.62
Part of the reason to interpret this exception narrowly is because the
standard for review of conditions that do not fall within this exception
should be one that mirrors the strict scrutiny standard that usually applies
to direct government restrictions on speech.63 Exceptions to this strict
59
See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1438, 1501 (providing examples where the government
incidentally or unintentionally alters the incentives for a benefits recipient to exercise his or her
constitutional rights).
60
See Olree, supra note 55, at 374 (providing examples of the Supreme Court upholding
viewpoint-based funding decisions “as a permissible decision by the federal government about how it
would design its own programs and spend its own money”).
61
See Kreimer, supra note 39, at 1391 (using the Establishment Clause as an example of a
constitutional provision that prevents the government from seeking the waiver of certain constitutional
rights). A better characterization of the Establishment Clause limitation on government authority, and
indeed of many constitutional limitations on government authority, may be as a structural as opposed to
individual rights-based limitation.
62
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833–34. For a discussion of the sometimes unclear distinction
between viewpoint and content discrimination, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
63
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741–42 (2011) (holding that
California’s ban on selling violent video games to minors was unconstitutional and the state could not
meet its burden under a strict scrutiny test); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467, 482 (2010)
(deciding that a statute prohibiting depictions of animal cruelty was an overly broad burden on free
speech after the lower court held that the state failed to meet its burden under a strict scrutiny test). But
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review should therefore be interpreted narrowly, lest they undermine the
high bar that otherwise applies to government imposed limits on speech.
The reason for applying a version of strict scrutiny adapted to the
unconstitutional conditions context is that if the right to free speech is
inalienable, the government should have to provide as strong a justification
for burdening that right indirectly as it does directly. That is, the
government should not be able to escape the restrictions it faces on direct
action by bargaining with a speaker, since such trading should not
generally be permitted for the reasons already discussed. If instead the
standard of review for speech-restricting conditions was a lower one—such
as the reasonableness standard essentially urged by the government in the
recent Alliance case64—the government would be able to do indirectly
what it could not do directly.
While this approach has much in common with the methodology
suggested by Sullivan more generally,65 this new approach goes further by
arguing that not only must the government have a compelling interest for
the speech-related condition, but the condition itself must be closely or
narrowly tailored to further that interest. Sullivan did not take this second
step in her analysis, perhaps in part because she was trying to develop a
more generally applicable unconstitutional conditions doctrine.66 At least
in the speech context, however, this second step seems a necessary one lest
the mere existence of a compelling interest in the general vicinity of a
speech-related condition provide sufficient justification for that condition,
even if the condition is only tenuously related to that interest. A mere
requirement that there be some type of connection between the condition at
issue and a compelling governmental interest results in an extremely
malleable test that undermines the requirement that the interest be
compelling.67
This approach differs from the “germaneness” standard applied in
some other contexts that implicate the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.68 For example, in South Dakota v. Dole,69 the Supreme Court
see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724, 2730–31 (2010) (holding that the
material-support statute was not unconstitutional, although a strict scrutiny test was not applied, while
Justice Breyer dissented arguing that strict scrutiny should have been applied to the government
action); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358–59, 366–67 (2009) (finding that a ban on
payroll deductions was not subject to a strict scrutiny test, with three justices dissenting at least in part,
including one justice who advocated for usage of a strict scrutiny test).
64
See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
65
See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1452–54 (stating that government monopoly on supplying a
benefit always restricts beneficiaries’ choices, regardless of how the state created the monopoly).
66
Id. at 1458.
67
See id. at 1474 (making a similar argument that whether a condition is constitutional should
turn on whether it is “germane” to the purpose of the benefit at issue).
68
See Renée Lettow Lerner, Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional Review
Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 775–78 (2007) (outlining an analysis of constitutional conditions on
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noted that conditions on federal grants to the states might be
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment “if they are unrelated ‘to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”70 Merely
being related to a particular national project or program is a far step from
the condition being narrowly tailored to the relevant project or program,
and also does not ensure that the purpose of the project or program is to
further a compelling governmental interest, as illustrated by Justice
O’Connor’s dissent highlighting the relatively loose connection between
the condition at issue in that case and the federal government interest at
stake.71 Similarly, in Dolan v. City of Tigard,72 the Supreme Court
required something more rigorous than a rational basis standard in the
context of a Fifth Amendment takings claim, calling instead for “rough
proportionality” with a “legitimate state interest.”73 The very language the
Court used confirms that the bar is set well below the standard of being
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest—which should
apply in the First Amendment speech context for the reasons already
discussed.
The approach proposed here also contrasts with the one urged,
unsuccessfully, by the government in Alliance. The government argued
that “Congress has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of
federal assistance in order to further broad policy objectives,”74 and further
stated that even heightened scrutiny would only apply when a funding
condition “is aimed at suppressing dangerous ideas or disfavored
viewpoints.”75 The government further argued that “Congress therefore
reasonably decided that recipients should be required to make a
commitment to the government that they will further central objectives of
the very program under which they seek and accept federal funds,”76
essentially confirming that the government was arguing for a
reasonableness standard to apply to this type of situation. The above
analysis leads to the conclusion that a strict scrutiny standard should apply
the Institutional Review Board regime, which conditions federal funding of academic research on
human beings at universities based on compliance with applicable federal statutes and regulations); Ilan
Wurman, Note, Drug Testing Welfare Recipients as a Constitutional Condition, 65 STAN. L. REV.
1153, 1178–84 (2013) (providing examples of unconstitutional conditions analyses in a variety of
contexts and examining the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing as a condition of receiving
welfare benefits).
69
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
70
Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
71
Id. at 214–15 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
72
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
73
Id. at 386, 391 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74
Brief for Petitioner at 17, Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2321 (2013) (No. 12-10).
75
Id. at 13.
76
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).

1062

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1045

instead.
Applying a strict scrutiny standard as opposed to a reasonableness
standard because of the burden on the exercise of free speech created by
the condition at issue also tracks the standard applied by the Supreme
Court in a number of other situations implicating constitutional rights that
otherwise would only merit application of the reasonableness standard.
For example, while economic legislation generally merits only application
of the reasonableness standard, the Court has applied the strict scrutiny
standard not only when speech is burdened by such legislation, but also
when racial discrimination that may violate the Fifth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment is at issue, when other fundamental rights
protected by those amendments are at issue, and when freedom of
association is at issue.77 This is not to say that a burden on any
constitutional right triggers strict scrutiny. For example, after applying
strict scrutiny, at least in name, to free exercise claims for several decades,
in 1990 the Supreme Court reverted to a reasonableness standard when a
law burdens religious exercise—so long as that law is a generally
applicable and neutral one.78 But particularly in the context of laws that
infringe on speech, the Court (and lower federal courts following the
Court’s lead) has applied a strict scrutiny standard when the “government
regulates protected speech on the basis of the substance of what is
expressed.”79
The above discussion therefore provides a framework for approaching
speech-related conditions imposed on benefits provided to nonprofits. It
does not, however, fully answer the question of what interests might be
compelling enough to justify such conditions, or what it means for a
condition to be closely or narrowly tailored to further that interest. The
next Part begins to answer those questions by considering the actual
disputes in this area that have reached the Supreme Court, particularly the
recent Alliance case.
III. APPLYING UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS TO NONPROFIT SPEECH
It is not difficult to identify actual disputes between nonprofits and
77
See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 833–40 (2006) (discussing contexts in which the
Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny). As Winkler notes, this heightened standard can be traced back
to the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Winkler, supra, at 798.
78
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (upholding a denial of unemployment
benefits as the ingestion of peyote for religious ceremonies still constitutes ingestion of illegal drugs for
employment purposes); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens,
and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1157–58 (2009) (examining pre-Smith case
law).
79
Winkler, supra note 77, at 844.
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government involving speech-related conditions. This Part focuses on
three disputes resolved by the Supreme Court. The first two involve,
respectively, a condition on indirect government funding that did not
involve a nonprofit speaking on behalf of the government (i.e., government
speech) and a condition on direct government funding that may have
involved government speech. The third and most recent dispute, the
Alliance case, involved a condition on direct government funding. In that
case, however, the Court shifted its categorization of cases from whether
the government was funding government speech to whether the
government was funding the program in which the speech occurred
(regardless of whether the nonprofit was channeling the government’s
voice).80 This shift is important because the understanding of the earlier
cases among federal courts appears to have been that the government
speech issue was critical. This view, in turn, leads to the conclusion that
speech-related conditions are more vulnerable constitutionally if the
nonprofit beneficiary is not speaking on the government’s behalf but
instead receiving government funding for other reasons—a conclusion that
is consistent with the framework developed above. If that view is now
suspect, however, it moves the application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in this context in the wrong direction.
A. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington81 (“TWR”)
involved a nonprofit organization challenging the lobbying limitation on
charitable, educational, and similar organizations that claim both
exemption from federal income tax and the ability to receive tax deductible
charitable contributions (“charities”).82 The government funding was
therefore indirect (through tax exemption and deductibility instead of
through a grant) and intermingled with private funding, and the speech at
The Supreme Court
issue was clearly not government speech.83
nevertheless concluded the limitation was constitutional, in significant part
because the nonprofit at issue had the option of creating a non-charitable
affiliate that could engage in unlimited lobbying—that is, an affiliate that
did not have access to the government “subsidy” provided through tax
deductible charitable contributions.84
The difficult issue raised by this case is that given the absence of
government speech, the limitation on speech paid for with non-government
funds is problematic. That said, there are two related grounds for
80

Alliance, 133 S. Ct at 2327–28, 2332.
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
82
Id. at 540–43.
83
Id. at 544–46.
84
Id. at 544–45.
81
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concluding that permitting the alternate channel of a non-charitable
affiliate for the limited speech renders the lobbying limitations sufficiently
narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interest in ensuring the
funds it provides are not used to pay for lobbying. First, with respect to the
charitable contribution deduction, if the availability of the deduction results
in increased giving because of the tax savings at least some donors enjoy,
then it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to separate the government
subsidy from the private, donated funds. While each donor knows whether
they benefit from the deduction (which for individuals is only available if
they itemize their deductions), the recipient charities are unlikely to have
this information, making it impractical for them to differentiate between
subsidized and non-subsidized donations.
It is possible, however, for charities to segregate their donations from
their other sources of revenue. If the deduction was the only subsidy, it
could be argued that a better tailored condition would be one that only
limited the use of contributions for lobbying, leaving charities free to spend
other funds on lobbying in an unlimited amount. The deduction is not the
only subsidy, however, because the Court also identified the exemption
from federal income tax as a subsidy.85 Since that subsidy is triggered by
merely having gross income that is greater than deductible expenses, that
subsidy is inseparable from all of the otherwise taxable income of the
charity (which would likely be most if not all income other than
contributions).86 The fact that Congress has chosen to permit other types
of nonprofits to receive these tax subsidies and engage in unlimited
lobbying does not undermine this reasoning as long as there is a reasonable
basis for distinguishing them from charities.87
It is true that an alternate system under which charities could lobby
without limitation, but only by using non-contribution income and paying
income tax on lobbying expenditures, would also accomplish the goal of
eliminating government funding for lobbying. That alternate system,
however, does not appear to be better tailored to the government’s
compelling interest in seeing its support only used for what it, permissibly,
chooses to support than a system under which a charitable organization can
85
461 U.S. at 544. But see Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447
(2011) (refusing to equate tax credits with governmental expenditures in the standing context).
86
The inability to separate the government funding from private funding was also present in
United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 213–14 (2003), where the Court held that
Congress could constitutionally condition access to a discount and grants that helped cover the cost of
Internet access for public libraries installing Internet filtering software to block obscenity and child
pornography.
87
See TWR, 461 U.S. at 550–51 (concluding that Congress’s decision to permit tax-exempt
veterans organizations to both receive deductible contributions and engage in unlimited lobbying was
neither a violation of the Equal Protection Clause nor otherwise unconstitutional because it was not
irrational for Congress to subsidize lobbying by veterans organizations but not charities).
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easily create a closely related and even controlled non-charitable affiliate
to engage in lobbying.88 So while the Court did not apply the exact
framework developed above, the Court reached the same conclusion as is
reached under this framework. That said, and as emphasized in Justice
Blackmun’s concurrence, the constitutionality of the lobbying limitation
condition (and presumably the similar political campaign intervention
prohibition) depends on it remaining relatively easy for charities to create
such non-charitable affiliates.89
The Supreme Court has since repeatedly appeared to indicate that this
easily-created-affiliate reasoning enjoys the support of a majority of the
Court.90 In fact, only a year later in FCC v. League of Women Voters,91 the
Court struck down a speech-related condition on federal funding precisely
because the statute at issue did not permit the creation of an affiliate
organization to engage in the disfavored speech with nonfederal funds.92
In League of Women Voters, Congress conditioned receipt of government
funding by noncommercial stations through the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting on not engaging in “editorializing.”93 Unlike in TWR (and in
Rust, discussed below), the government did not provide a means for
affected stations to engage in the prohibited speech through a closely
related affiliate using only private funds.94 That difference proved fatal to
the government’s attempt to rely on TWR, since the Court found that the
government failed to meet the First Amendment standard that applied in
the broadcast context absent the ability to create such affiliates.95

88
The Internal Revenue Service takes the position that a charity may not be directly affiliated
with or control, either directly or indirectly, a non-charitable affiliate that engages in political campaign
intervention because a charity is not permitted to engage in any such activity; it does, however, permit
indirect affiliation between such entities. WARD L. THOMAS & JUDITH E. KINDELL, S. AFFILIATIONS
AMONG POLITICAL, LOBBYING AND EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 255, 260, 264 (1999), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopics00.pdf.
89
TWR, 461 U.S. at 553–54 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For a case applying this reasoning to the
prohibition on charities engaging in political campaign intervention, see Branch Ministries v. Rossotti,
211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
90
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (2013); Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197–98 (1991); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399–400
(1984); see also Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 143 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court accepts
this reasoning); Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
100, 116–17 (2007) (acknowledging that the majority of the justices accept this reasoning). But see
Alliance, 133 S. Ct. at 2334 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the ability to use a closely related
affiliate to engage in lobbying was “entirely nonessential to the Court’s holding” in TWR).
91
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
92
Id. at 400–01.
93
Id. at 366.
94
Id. at 400.
95
Id. at 384–86, 402.
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B. Rust v. Sullivan
In Rust v. Sullivan,96 nonprofit organizations received federal funds
under Title X of the Public Health Service Act to provide family-planning
services.97 Regulations under that provision prohibited “Title X projects”
from providing information regarding abortion as a method of family
planning and further required such projects to be physically and financially
separate from any prohibited abortion activities.98 The organizations and
doctors associated with them argued the regulations were unconstitutional
both with respect to the limitations on speech funded by the Title X grants
and with respect to the limitations on speech funded by non-federal funds
but which were not spent in a physically separate facility.99 In contrast to
TWR, Rust therefore involved direct government funding. The Court
characterized the challenge as a facial one to the regulations and concluded
the regulations were in fact, on their face, constitutional.100
With respect to the limitation on speech funded by the government,
the requirement that the speech be fully funded by the government was
met.101 The other requirement for the limitation to be constitutional—that
the speech be speech the government could engage in directly—was a
matter of dispute since the speech was about family planning and yet
explicitly did not include discussion of abortion, the right to which is
constitutionally protected under other Supreme Court decisions.102 It is
beyond the scope of this Article to address that dispute, but if the majority
was correct that such selective speech by the government was permitted
constitutionally then this requirement was met as well.103 So under the
framework developed above, the Court was correct in its conclusion that
the limitation on speech fully funded by the government was
constitutional.
The limitation on speech funded by non-federal funds is more
problematic, however. As written, the majority opinion appears to
conclude that the limitation is constitutional because it is a reasonable
requirement to ensure federal funds are not used for the prohibited
speech.104 The separate physical facility requirement is not, however,
96

500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Id. at 178–79.
98
Id. at 179–80.
99
Id. at 181, 192.
100
Id. at 177–78.
101
See id. at 192–193 (“[T]he Government may make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”).
102
Id.
103
See id. at 201–02 (“The difficulty that a woman encounters when a Title X project does not
provide abortion counseling or referral leaves her in no different position than she would have been if
the Government had not enacted Title X.”).
104
Id. at 194–95.
97
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narrowly tailored to further the government’s compelling interest in
ensuring its funds are spent as it has directed. Less burdensome measures,
such as requiring careful cost accounting, plausibly would be sufficient to
satisfy this interest.105 On its face, therefore, the speech-related condition
limiting the use of non-federal funds is not constitutional under the
framework developed above.
An interesting aspect of subsequent decisions relying on this case is,
however, that several of those later decisions appear to engage in what is
arguably revisionist history by characterizing the government-funded
speech as not only government-funded but in fact government speech,
albeit done through a private party.106 While this reading may not be
accurate, it makes the result in the case consistent with the framework
proposed here. Under this reading of the case, the government has a
compelling interest not only in ensuring that its funds are spent on their
designated purpose but also in ensuring that its speech is not undermined
by or confused with other, non-government speech that is coming from the
same speaker in the same physical facility.107 In the case of government
speech, therefore, the separate physical facility requirement is arguably
105
In fact, the petitioners in Rust argued that the physical separation requirement imposed a
substantial burden on their speech and might in fact make it impossible for them to engage in desired
speech with non-government funds. Brief for Petitioners at 27–30, Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (No. 89-1391).
The Supreme Court did not directly address this argument.
106
See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did not
place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have
explained Rust on this understanding.”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (characterizing the situation in Rust as one where “the government did not create
a program to encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to transmit specific
information pertaining to its own program”); DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d
758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Under Rust, as interpreted by Rosenberger and Velazquez, the government
may thus constitutionally communicate a particular viewpoint through its agents and require those
agents not convey contrary messages.”); Brian H. Bix, Perfectionist Policies in Family Law, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1055, 1059 & n.24 (reviewing LINDA MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING
CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY) (stating that the “Court’s views on government speech
and subsidy of speech are scanty and inconsistent” while also stating that the Court distinguished Rust
in several subsequent cases and reaffirmed the government’s right “to subsidize viewpoints selectively
when the government . . . uses private speakers to promote the government’s views”); Deborah Kelly,
Note, The Legal Services Corporation’s Solicitation Restriction and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine: Has the Death Knell Sounded for Future Challenges to the Restriction?, 29 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 247, 270 n.160 (2004) (stating that the majority opinion in Rust has since been distinguished
in subsequent cases to apply only to “instances of governmental speech”). Interestingly, Justice
Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinions in both Velazquez and Rosenberger, but there is no overlap
between the other justices in the five-justice majorities in the two cases (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer comprised the majority in Velazquez and Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas comprised
the majority in Rosenberger). Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 533; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819.
107
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (“When the government disburses public funds to private
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that
its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”).
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narrowly tailored to a compelling interest because of this risk of such
undermining or confusion.
As these two different views and results demonstrate, it was therefore
critical whether the speech at issue is only government-funded or is in fact
also identified as government speech, at least prior to the recent Alliance
decision. The line between these two types of speech can be difficult to
draw.108 Given the strict scrutiny that applies to speech-related conditions,
the government should have the burden of clearly demonstrating that the
speech was government speech. What arguably was absent in Rust was
such a clear demonstration, and absent such a clear demonstration the
government should not have been able to impose a speech-related
condition. The Court therefore was incorrect to uphold as constitutional
the limitation on the non-government funded speech, at least on the record
available to it at the time. The revised version of the facts apparently
adopted by the Court in later decisions would, however, have provided a
sufficient basis for upholding the limitation on non-government funded
speech at issue in Rust. In its latest decision in this area, however, the
Supreme Court avoided this distinction by instead reformulating the key
issue as whether the condition is within or outside of a government
spending program, a shift that both could have significant consequences in
this area and is contrary to the framework proposed in this Article.109
C. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society
International
In the most recent dispute in this area to reach the Supreme Court, at
issue was a provision of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (“the Act”) that barred funding
under the Act for any group or organization “that does not have a policy
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”110 To enforce this
prohibition, the implementing agencies required the recipients of funding
under the Act to document their opposition to prostitution and sex
trafficking.111 The agencies also established guidelines requiring sufficient
108
See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 163 (1996) (“The criteria for
establishing whether speech ought to be characterized as public discourse [a subset of nongovernmental speech that contributes to democratic self-governance], are complex, contextual, and
obscure, and particularly so in cases of subsidized speech. I am confident that there can be no simple
empirical or descriptive line of demarcation.” (footnote omitted)). In part to address this difficulty,
Post develops a new category of speech that he characterizes as speech within a “managerial” domain.
Id. at 164.
109
See infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text (discussing Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. v.
Legal Services Corp., 462 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006)).
110
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (2013)
(quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111
Id. at 2326.
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separation from any affiliated entities that did not comply with this
requirement, with the sufficiency of such separation determined based on
not only the extent of legal and financial separation but also the extent to
which the organizations maintained separate personnel and physical
facilities.112
Under the framework developed above, the government is
constitutionally permitted to provide funding that can only be used for
speech opposing prostitution, assuming the government could engage in
such speech directly, and to bar the use of its funding for any speech or
activity promoting prostitution. The Act here, in fact, included such a bar,
which was not challenged in this litigation.113 The challenged provision
went further, however, in that it required the recipient groups to also
comply with speech-related restrictions relating to their use of nongovernment funds by affirmatively taking a position opposing prostitution
and sex trafficking, with the ability to take an inconsistent position
permitted only if they not only acted through an affiliate, but an affiliate
that was sufficiently separate from the group receiving funds under the
Act.
As discussed in connection with Rust, such restrictions on the use of
private funds might be justified if the recipient of the government funding
was clearly identified as speaking on behalf of the government and a
failure to maintain this level of separation would undermine or confuse that
government speech.114 But also as noted with respect to Rust, if speechrelated conditions are subject to strict scrutiny as proposed in this Article,
the government should bear the burden of demonstrating both that clearly
the speech was government speech, not merely government-funded speech,
and that the degree of separation required is necessary to protect the
integrity of that speech.115 The record in this case indicates the
government failed to make either demonstration. The funding was not for
an anti-prostitution messaging campaign on behalf of the government,
which campaign would be clearly undermined if in essentially the
organization’s next (non-government funded) breath the recipient group
could contradict that message. Rather, the funding was for programs
combatting HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria more generally.116 In
addition, the government was requiring the recipient organizations to
assume for all purposes an anti-prostitution position as their own
112

Id. at 2326–27.
Id.
114
See text accompanying supra note 106.
115
See text accompanying supra note 107.
116
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 237–38, 264
(2d Cir. 2011) (“The stated purpose of the Leadership Act is to fight HIV/AIDS, as well as tuberculosis,
and malaria. Defendants cannot now recast the Leadership Act’s global HIV/AIDS-prevention
program as an anti-prostitution messaging campaign.” (footnote omitted)).
113
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position—not merely to promulgate that position on behalf of the
government.117
The Supreme Court did not rely on the government speech versus
private speech divide, however (the “speech” approach). Instead, the
Court recharacterized the relevant divide as between “conditions that
define the limits of the government spending program—those that specify
the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to
leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program
itself.”118 It then cited TWR, League of Women Voters, and Rust as
exemplifying this “spending” approach, categorizing TWR and Rust as
involving speech-related conditions only on the relevant government
spending program and League of Women Voters as involving conditions
relating to speech outside the contours of such a program.119
This is a subtle but important, and ultimately problematic, shift. Under
either the speech or the spending approach, a one hundred percent
government funded effort may constitutionally have speech-related
conditions—that is, the government has a compelling interest in getting
what it is paying for—subject to the three limitations noted earlier.120
Similarly, if a government-imposed condition restricts speech that is not
funded by the government and is clearly separate from and does not
interfere with or undermine the government-funded activities or speech,
then such a condition is almost certainly unconstitutional under either the
speech or the spending approach. The differing approaches may, however,
lead to significantly different results in between these extremes for at least
two reasons.
First, the speech approach is significantly narrower than the spending
approach in that it only allows a lower level of constitutional protection for
a significantly smaller segment of activities. TWR provides a striking
example of this difference. TWR did not involve government speech—
charities that receive government subsidies in the form of tax deductible
contributions are not speaking on behalf of the government in any way.121
Yet, using the spending approach, the Supreme Court in Alliance
characterized TWR’s activities—and by extension, the activities of all
charities—as a government spending program.122 The spending approach
therefore creates the possibility of speech-related restrictions being
permitted, as a constitutional matter, on a much broader range of activities
117

Alliance, 133 S. Ct. at 2330.
Id. at 2328.
119
Id. at 2328–29.
120
See supra text accompanying notes 61–62.
121
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 542 (1983) (recognizing that
Taxation with Representation “proposes to advocate its point of view” (emphasis added)).
122
Alliance, 133 S. Ct. at 2328–29.
118

2014]

NONPROFITS, SPEECH, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS

1071

that receive some level of government support even if those activities do
not constitute government speech.
Relatedly, the spending approach as described by the Supreme Court
would subject any activity that received even a relatively small proportion
of funding from the government as a government spending program and
thus subject to less protection from speech-related conditions under the
First Amendment. While TWR involved activities only partially funded by
the government, for the reasons detailed above, it was difficult—if not
impossible—for a charity to separate the government funding stream from
private sources because of how tax deductions and tax exemptions
function, and so requiring charities to create separate affiliates that do not
receive any government funding to engage in the speech at issue
(lobbying) was narrowly tailored to further the compelling governmental
interest in not having the government funds be used for such speech.123
This was only true, however, if the burden of creating and maintaining
such entities was relatively light.124
This contrasts with the situation in Rust, which at least later decisions
characterized as involving government speech.125 In Rust, the Supreme
Court upheld the speech-related condition even though the government
required that a privately funded affiliate that engaged in the speech at issue
not only be legally and financially separate but also have separate staff and
physical facilities.126 If, therefore, the spending approach is the one to be
used going forward, as opposed to the speech approach, it would suggest
that the government could constitutionally require the lobbying affiliate of
a charity to not only be legally and financially separate but also, as was the
case in Rust, to have separate staffs and facilities even if doing so would
impose a substantial burden on the ability of the charity to engage in
substantial lobbying through that affiliate.
This result would be
inconsistent with both the TWR majority opinion and the more extensive
discussion of this issue in Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, which at least
up to now appeared to have been adopted by the Court in its later
decisions.127
The Supreme Court in Alliance did not accept an argument by the
government along these lines, but the reason it cited for not doing so turned
on the fact that the speech-related condition in this case did not only forbid
certain speech, but affirmatively required certain speech.128 More
123

See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
125
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
126
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180–81 (1991) (describing the required degree of
separation).
127
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
128
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330–31 (2013).
124
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specifically, the government argued that the speech-related condition was
constitutional because it allowed recipients of funding under the Act to
establish affiliates that communicated a contrary message relating to
prostitution as long those affiliates were sufficiently separate.129 The Court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the speech-related condition required
a recipient to state a specific belief and so if the affiliate was closely
enough associated with the recipient such that the affiliate’s speech would
be considered effectively the recipient’s speech (although funded with nongovernmental funds), “the recipient can express those beliefs [that are
contrary to opposing legalization of prostitution] only at the price of
evident hypocrisy.”130 The Court, therefore, did not address the situation
where the condition imposed by the government only prohibited certain
speech as opposed to requiring certain speech, leaving open the possibility
that the affiliate argument would have been successful in that situation
even if the government required the affiliate to be separate not only legally
and financially, but also physically and with respect to its staff.
The existence of this possibility is significant for at least three reasons.
First, under the speech approach that appears to have controlled before this
decision, the government would bear the more difficult burden of
demonstrating that the recipient was in fact speaking on behalf of the
government before the government could constitutionally require an
affiliate engaging in the prohibited speech to have a high (and likely
burdensome) level of separation. Under the spending approach, all the
government has to show is that there is at least partial government funding,
that the condition prohibits speech but does not require it, and that the
government permits the recipient to engage in the prohibited speech with
non-governmental funds through an affiliate that satisfies a reasonable (not
narrowly tailored) separation requirement. As the petitioners in Rust
noted, requiring separate physical facilities and separate staffs will often
impose significant additional financial costs.131
Second, this shift could resolve in the government’s favor a longrunning dispute involving legal services organizations, albeit a dispute that
was already trending the government’s way. The dispute involves the
government subjecting recipients of government funding from the Legal
Services Corporation132 to a requirement that they engage in certain
speech-related activities—such as participating in class action lawsuits and
129

Id. at 2331.
Id.
131
See supra note 105.
132
The Legal Services Corporation is a federally funded charitable nonprofit controlled by
directors appointed by the President (and confirmed by the Senate); it distributes federal funds to
independent nonprofit legal aid programs across the country. Fact Sheet on the Legal Services
Corporation, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about/what-is-lsc (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
130
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in-person solicitation of clients—only through affiliates that are legally,
financially, and physically separate from the entity receiving the
government funding.133 While the federal courts considering this challenge
and similar challenges have generally concluded that this requirement is
constitutional,134 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit left open
the possibility that the requirement would be unconstitutional as applied to
the plaintiffs if they could demonstrate that the requirement did not provide
an adequate alternative means of engaging in the speech using private
funds, remanding the case back to the federal district court to resolve this
factual point.135 At the same time, the Second Circuit rejected the
compelling interest, narrowly tailored approach urged in this Article,136 and
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Alliance would provide further support
for that rejection.
Third, this shift could possibly allow the government to impose this
higher separation requirement on affiliates created by charities to engage in
lobbying (and political campaign intervention) beyond the limits permitted
for charities themselves, effectively overruling TWR in this regard. There
are, however, at least two potential barriers to this outcome. First, neither
Congress nor the Treasury Department may have any interest in imposing
such a requirement given that charities and their non-charitable, taxexempt affiliates from across the political spectrum have long relied on the
ability of charities to easily create affiliates in order to engage in lobbying
and political campaign intervention.137 The Internal Revenue Service has
been particularly solicitous in this regard, although in large part because it
apparently felt that TWR required that approach.138 While there have
133
See Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 222–23 (2d Cir. 2006)
(discussing the prohibition of certain speech related activities); Kelly, supra note 106, at 256 (stating
that certain restrictions prohibit LSC fund recipients from engaging in various speech related acts).
134
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198–99 (1991) (finding that “Title X projects” that were
physically and financially separate from any prohibited abortion activities regulations were in fact, on
their face, constitutional); DKT Int’l v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(finding that a subsidiary could constitutionally qualify for government funds as long as the two
organizations’ activities were kept sufficiently separate).
135
Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d at 223–24, 232–33. Recently, plaintiffs in the Second
Circuit litigation voluntarily dismissed their case without public explanation. Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal by Bronx Legal Services, Dobbins v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 1:01-CV-08371 (E.D.N.Y.
July 23, 2013).
136
Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d at 229–30.
137
See THOMAS & KINDEL, supra note 88, at 255 (“In an increasingly common arrangement, an
[Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”)] 501(c)(3) educational organization formally or informally affiliates
with an IRC 501(c) (4), (5), or (6) lobbying organization with a related IRC 527 political organization
or PAC.”).
138
See Memorandum from Lois G. Lerner, Dir., Exempt Org., Internal Revenue Serv., to Marsha
Ramirez, Dir., Examinations, Internal Revenue Serv. (Apr. 17, 2008), available at
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2008_paci_program_letter.pdf (“Enforcement in this area requires [the IRS
Exempt Organizations Division] to consider the implications of Taxation with Representation of
Washington, particularly Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion.”).
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recently been numerous calls for reining in non-charitable tax-exempt
organizations, particularly with respect to political campaign intervention,
those criticisms do not appear to have created much momentum for
legislation or regulatory change.139 This barrier is political, however, not
constitutional.
The second potential barrier is the third limitation on the government
controlling how its funds are spent with respect to speech noted above.140
That limitation is the holding in the Rosenberger case: if the government
funds a public forum in which it permits and indeed encourages many
forms of private speech, it generally may not discriminate based on
viewpoint with respect to the speech it funds, although it may discriminate
based on content if such discrimination preserves the limited purposes of
the forum.141 While what distinguishes “content” discrimination from
“viewpoint” discrimination is not completely clear from the opinion, or,
indeed, subsequent case law, it is a distinction the Court continues to
support.142 This barrier is not, however, very strong, in that Rosenberger
cited TWR as an example of a situation where viewpoint discrimination did
not occur.143 That is, restrictions that apply to lobbying (and political
campaign intervention) are only content restrictions and not viewpoint
restrictions—as long as they apply to all lobbying and not lobbying from a
particular policy or political perspective. This conclusion appears
unavoidable, and thus Rosenberger is not in fact a real barrier to the
government imposing a higher separation requirement.
Finally, it should be noted that the government also was unsuccessful
with an affiliate argument in the Citizens United campaign finance case.144
139
The limited amount of bipartisan support for proposals along these lines makes their passage
unlikely given the current partisan divide in Congress. See Kenneth P. Doyle, 501(c)(4) Limit,
Corporate, Union Disclosure, Combined in Rep. Cartwright’s New Measure, BLOOMBERG BNA
MONEY & POL. REP., July 16, 2013 (reporting on the introduction of a bill in this area by House
Democrat with twenty House Democrat co-sponsors but no apparent Republican support); Kenneth P.
Doyle, New Murkowski-Wyden Disclosure Measure Stirs Hope for Bipartisan Campaign Reform,
BLOOMBERG BNA MONEY & POL. REP., Apr. 24, 2013 (reporting on the introduction of a bipartisan
campaign finance bill, but quoting the participating Republican Senator as conceding that passage
would not be easy).
140
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
141
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).
142
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (stating that in the context of
speech on government property, “any restriction based on the content of the speech must satisfy strict
scrutiny . . . and restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited” (citation omitted)); Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 831 (“[I]t must be acknowledged, the distinction [between content discrimination and viewpoint
discrimination] is not a precise one.”). But see Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
584–86 (1998) (concluding that the NEA could constitutionally make aesthetic judgments, including
taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the “diverse beliefs and values of
the American public” when making funding decisions).
143
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
144
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 356, 361 (2010).
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In that case, the government was defending the ban on corporate general
treasury spending on express advocacy and electioneering
communications.145 In holding that ban unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court discussed whether the ability of a corporation to create a political
action committee, or PAC, provided a constitutionally sufficient alternate
channel for the corporation’s speech.146 The Court concluded that it did
not, both because, as a separate entity, a PAC is not the corporation, so its
speech is not the corporation’s speech, and because PACs “are burdensome
alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive
regulations.”147 This conclusion likely is not incompatible with either TWR
or Rust; however, a key distinction between Citizens United and the
various unconstitutional conditions cases is that the latter cases involve
government funding while Citizens United does not.148
The Supreme Court’s decision in Alliance therefore appears to have
both muddied the waters even more in this area and moved the Court in the
wrong direction. Rather than clarifying the approaches taken in the earlier
cases addressing similar situations, it instead recharacterized them in a
manner that leaves even the strength of those cases as precedents uncertain.
Is the critical factual determination whether the funded activity is
government speech, as some cases have suggested, or is it now whether the
speech condition is outside of a government spending program? Alliance
suggests the latter,149 but its failure to even acknowledge the former
distinction makes it unclear whether that distinction also is still relevant.
Alliance left undisturbed the (recharacterized) holding in League of Women
Voters that a speech prohibition reaching beyond a government spending
program is unconstitutional if the funding recipient is not permitted to
engage in the speech as well, whether directly or through an affiliate. It,
however, left uncertain under what circumstances the government can only
require such an affiliate to be minimally separate from the funding
recipient, as was the case in TWR, as opposed to being able to require a
significantly greater (and more burdensome) extent of separation, as was
the case in Rust and is the case in the legal services dispute.
It could be argued that the Court’s adoption of a spending approach in
Alliance is more consistent with the Rust decision in that the later
145

Id. at 318–19.
Id. at 337, 339.
147
Id. at 337.
148
It has been argued that the state law benefits enjoyed by corporations are akin to a subsidy, but
it is not clear that the Citizens United Court accepted that argument. Mayer, supra note 32, at 416.
There are also numerous reasons to conclude that Citizens United did not implicitly overrule TWR. Id.
at 415–16.
149
See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013)
(suggesting that the regulation of the speech condition is outside the context of a government spending
program).
146
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characterization of the latter case as involving government speech did not
reflect the actual facts of that case.150 For the reasons already discussed,
however, if Rust did not involve government speech, then the case was
wrongly decided under the framework put forward by this Article.151 If
indirect restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny, as argued
above, then the government can only impose such restrictions as a
condition for receiving government funding either if the funding is for
government speech and permitting the targeted speech would undermine
that government communication, or if an easy alternate way is provided for
engaging in such speech without the use of the government funding. In
Alliance, neither situation applied. The speech in Alliance was not
apparently government speech that would be undermined unless the
recipient, as an entity, declared its opposition to the legalization of
prostitution. Furthermore, the alternate way provided by the government
was insufficient not only because it would be ineffective (since the
affiliate’s speech, if truly the speech of the recipient, would be hypocritical
because it would be in direct conflict with the affiliate’s (compelled)
speech) but because it went well beyond what was arguably necessary to
ensure the recipient used the government funds as directed. Alliance,
therefore, is problematic under the framework argued for here, both
because not only is it in itself inconsistent with that framework, but also
because it reverses the longstanding (albeit perhaps untrue to the facts of
the case) interpretation of Rust that was consistent with that framework.
Lastly, the argument of the dissent in Alliance is that the government
should be free to choose recipients who adhere to the government’s
preferred views generally and not just in government-funded
communications.152 The majority argues both that this approach ignores
aspects of the Court’s own precedents and that the dissent incorrectly
discounts the effect of the speech-related condition by characterizing it as
only a selection criterion when it in fact serves as an incentive for potential
recipients to adopt a position they otherwise would not adopt.153 The first
criticism is correct, although the majority is also guilty of selective
ignorance with respect to the relevant precedents, as discussed above.154
The problem with the second criticism is that the dissent is correct that
there is no coercion, in the sense of an offer the recipients cannot refuse,
150

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
152
See Alliance, 133 S. Ct. at 2332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of the
government’s freedom to choose which programs to assist based on similar viewpoints).
153
See id. at 2328, 2330 (majority opinion) (suggesting that the policy condition proposed by the
dissent “goes beyond defining the limits of the federally funded program to defining the recipient”).
154
See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Rust, Regan, and League of Women Voters in the context of activities that receive government
funding).
151
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here.
Instead there is simply a purchasing of the recipient’s
constitutional right to free speech—whether that speech is government
funded or not, since the required position must be adopted by the recipient
as its own. But under the framework developed in this Article, that is the
heart of the constitutional problem: If speech rights are generally
inalienable as against the government under the First Amendment, and if
therefore any abridgement of such rights by the government—whether
direct or indirect—is subject to strict scrutiny, then the government is not
permitted to buy an organization’s speech absent a compelling
governmental interest in doing so and then only if the purchase is done in a
manner that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. This standard
cannot be met under the facts in Alliance.
The Alliance decision could therefore significantly increase the ability
of the government to impose speech-related conditions on nonprofits that
receive government funding in any form. As already noted, it solidifies the
government’s victories in the Legal Services Corporation dispute and
potentially opens the door to the government imposing greater burdens on
charities that create non-charitable affiliates to engage in speech that
exceeds the limits imposed on the charities themselves. It also could
permit both the federal and state governments to attach speech-related
conditions to any of the vast array of government funding mechanisms that
benefit nonprofits—not only contracts and grants, but also fees for services
(such as health care) and indirect funding mechanisms such as exemptions
from state and local taxes. For example, in recent years there have been
attempts to tie federal National and Community Service Act funds to limits
on lobbying by both the recipient organization and any “co-locat[ing]”
entity156 and to require affordable housing grant recipients to not engage in
any election-related activity even with private funds and on a completely
nonpartisan and neutral basis;157 both of these measures successfully made
it through the House of Representatives. While constitutionally suspect
under both the framework proposed here and pre-Alliance case law, postAlliance it is far less clear that such restrictions would be found by the
courts to be unconstitutional conditions.

155
See Alliance, 133 S. Ct. at 2334 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, as I suggested earlier, the
contention that the condition here ‘coerces’ respondents’ speech is on its face implausible. Those
organizations that wish to take a different tack with respect to prostitution ‘are as unconstrained now as
they were before the enactment of [the Leadership Act].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 595 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
156
Generations Invigorating Volunteerism and Education Act, H.R. 1388, 111th Cong., § 1304(b)
(as passed by House, Mar. 18, 2009).
157
Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 1461, 109th Cong., § 128 (as passed by
House, Oct. 26, 2005).

1078

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1045

IV. BROADER RAMIFICATIONS
The previous Parts have developed and applied a framework for
addressing the constitutionality of speech-related conditions imposed on
government funding provided, whether directly or indirectly, to nonprofit
organizations. The framework is both consistent with the Constitution and
provides significant clarity to this area of law, clarity which the shifting
reasoning of Supreme Court opinions, and particularly the recent Alliance
decision, demonstrate is much needed. The approach taken in this Article
may also help to clarify the application of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine more generally in two important ways. First, the specific
framework used here may be applicable to speech-related conditions
imposed in other contexts, such as in the campaign finance area. Second,
the customized approach employed here may prove useful in more
disparate constitutional settings.
A. Speech in Other Contexts
As others have detailed, attempts to develop global approaches to
unconstitutional conditions have been unsuccessful in large part because of
the many different constitutional contexts in which such conditions can
arise.158 This Article takes a different approach by focusing on how the
doctrine should apply in a specific constitutional and factual context. By
doing so, it is much easier to develop a coherent and constitutionally
supportable approach. At the same time, however, that approach need not
only be of use in the particular context of its origin. While the conflicts
discussed in this Article related to speech and benefits received by
nonprofit organizations, such disputes also extend to for-profit
organizations. For example, the existing prohibition on federal campaign
contributions from persons with government contracts faces a court
challenge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.159 While not characterized as an unconditional conditions case by

158
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 27 (“[The] hierarchy of legal rights makes the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions especially difficult to apply to complex modern statutory schemes that
implement explicit or implicit transfers of wealth for purposes now regarded as unquestionably
legitimate—for example, to regulate land use, or to help the needy or unemployed.”); Gabriel Gillett,
Note, A World Without Internet: A New Framework for Analyzing a Supervised Release Condition that
Restricts Computer and Internet Access, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 217, 231 (2010) (“Though the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is centuries old, it remains difficult to predict when it applies, and
if it applies, when it is violated.”).
159
See Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (vacating the judgment of the
district court and remanding the case to the district court for certification of facts and constitutional
questions to the en banc court of appeals within five days of the opinion); Kenneth P. Doyle,
Contractor Campaign Money Case to Be Heard by D.C. Circuit Sept. 30, BLOOMBERG BNA MONEY &
POL. REP., June 20, 2013 (“A constitutional challenge to the long-standing federal ban on campaign
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the district court, the case could and probably should be characterized in
this way—the ability to receive a government contract is generally a
benefit to which private parties do not have a right, and the campaign
contributions bar imposed on persons receiving this benefit is a speechrelated condition under current case law.161 The resolution of this
challenge should therefore turn on an application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, and therefore, the principles developed with respect to
nonprofit organizations in similar situations should also apply. The more
coherent framework developed here could have application outside of the
limited context of speech-related conditions imposed on benefits received
by nonprofit organizations.
Another specific situation implicated by this reasoning is speech by
public employees. In this context, the Supreme Court has made a
distinction between such employees speaking as citizens addressing
matters of public concern, in which case they enjoy First Amendment
protection from government retaliation for their speech, balanced against
the government’s need as an employer to operate efficiently and
effectively, and when they are not doing so, in which case no First
Amendment protection is available.162 As Randy Kozel has detailed,
however, the Court has failed to provide an adequate theoretical basis for
the balancing test it has adopted in this area.163 Kozel proposes instead a
presumption of parity for First Amendment purposes between citizens and
government employees, a presumption that can only be overcome if there
is “a valid reason for permitting the government to treat the employee
differently from her peers in the citizenry at large.”164 While Kozel does
not employ level of scrutiny language in his proposed approach to this
situation, adopting the framework proposed here would appear to be
consistent with his approach of limiting rebuttal of the presumption of
money from government contractors will be considered by the full federal appeals court for
Washington, D.C., in an argument now set for the end of September.”).
160
See Wagner v. FEC, 901 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 (D.D.C. 2012) (analyzing the case under a First
Amendment challenge and an equal-protection argument), vacated by 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013);
Wagner v. FEC, 854 F. Supp. 2d 83, 85 (D.D.C. 2012) (evaluating three federal contractors’ motion for
a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood of success of their First Amendment and Fifth
Amendment equal-protection claims).
161
See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 246 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“Buckley recognized that
contribution limits . . . ‘implicate fundamental First Amendment interests,’ namely, the freedoms of
‘political expression’ and ‘political association.’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)));
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (“A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and
his views . . . .”).
162
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 597–98 (1972) (applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to an allegedly speech-related
denial of public employment).
163
Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory of Public Employee Rights, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1985, 2008–09 (2012).
164
Id. at 2011.
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parity only to situations where an employee speaks in discharging official
responsibilities (i.e., the government’s compelling interest in getting what
it is paying for) and ensuring fulfillment of the institutional mission for the
portion of government for which the employee works (i.e., the
government’s compelling interest in not having the purpose of its program
undermined).165
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to fully explore the possible
application of the framework developed here to these different but related
contexts where the government has imposed speech-related conditions on
the receipt of government funding, doing so may in fact help clarify the
constitutional standards in those areas as well.
B. Other Constitutional Contexts
More broadly, not attempting to develop a grand theory of
unconstitutional conditions that is applicable to all constitutional rights in
all situations, but instead focusing on the application of the doctrine to a
particular constitutional context, and then considering whether that
application can be incrementally extended, perhaps in a modified form, to
other contexts may be a viable approach for achieving coherence in the
unconstitutional conditions area more generally. Such coherence is
important, particularly given the calls by some scholars to abandon the
doctrine completely.166
It is important to recognize, however, that the framework developed
for the specific context of speech-related conditions that implicate the First
Amendment is almost certainly not readily transferrable to other
constitutional contexts. For example, as illustrated by the recent Supreme
Court decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,167
the critical issue in the Fifth Amendment takings context is not whether the
government may generally take private property in exchange for a
government benefit—it of course can do so as long as it pays just
compensation and the property is taken for public use.168 Rather, the issue
is under what circumstances can the government effectively take property
as a condition for a permit or license without paying just compensation.169
A completely different approach is therefore likely needed in this
165
Id. at 2022. Another possible context is speech-related conditions on tax benefits available to
individuals or for-profit businesses. See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 499 (1959)
(denial of federal income tax deduction for amounts spent for defeat of legislation); Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 514–15 (1958) (state property tax exemption for veterans conditioned on taking an oath
against violent or unlawful overthrow of the state or federal government).
166
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
167
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
168
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
169
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594–95.
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constitutional context from the one taken in this Article with respect to the
First Amendment-protected speech context.
Similarly, and as illustrated by the recent Supreme Court decision in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,170 the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine also applies in the Tenth Amendment
context when the federal government places conditions on federal funding
provided to the states.171 In that context, the key inquiry is whether such a
condition in effect undermines the constitutionally recognized sovereignty
of the states, a constitutional structure consideration unique to that
context.172 Again, this significant constitutional difference likely requires a
completely different approach to possible unconstitutional conditions than
either the speech or takings contexts.
Cass Sunstein suggests such a customized approach, but he argues for
abandoning the doctrine altogether.173 While I agree that a fully unitary
approach to the doctrine is misguided given the often significant
differences between various constitutional contexts as noted above, at least
in the constitutional context this Article focuses on, it appears that
considerations of some of the broader themes developed under the
doctrine, such as whether a given constitutional right is alienable, are
useful. I therefore would hesitate to throw out the entire idea of an
“unconstitutional conditions doctrine,” while still recognizing that the
doctrine will not apply in the same way in all constitutional contexts.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the pervasiveness of government benefits in the nonprofit sector
and not uncommon attempts by governments to attach speech-related
strings to such benefits, it is critical that a way be found to clarify the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in this context. This Article’s
approach suggests a way that may be possible through careful
consideration of the doctrine in this particular area. More specifically, in
the context of a condition on a government benefit that implicates First
Amendment protected speech, the questions to ask are whether the right to
free speech is alienable as to the government and, if it is generally not,
what the standard is for determining when there are constitutionally
170

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
See id. at 2603–04 (“We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the receipt of [federal]
funds on the States’ complying with restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is the means by
which Congress ensures that the funds are spent according to its view of the ‘general Welfare.’
Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds, however, cannot be justified on that basis.
When, for example, such conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent
grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy
changes.”).
172
Id. at 2602.
173
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 608.
171
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acceptable exceptions to this conclusion. With the answers to these
questions in hand, the situations addressed by the Supreme Court over the
past several decades, and most recently in the Alliance case, can be readily
resolved, and lower courts, the government, and private parties will have
significantly clearer guidance regarding how to resolve future disputes in
this area. Moreover, this approach may also be useful in other First
Amendment situations, such as campaign finance rules tied to government
benefits and limits on speech by public employees.
It is important to recognize, however, that the approach taken in this
Article—determining the alienability with respect to the government of the
constitutional right at issue and then when exceptions to that initial
determination are available—likely only works with respect to the
particular constitutional context considered here. In other constitutional
contexts, different questions will likely need to be asked to determine when
a condition on the provision of a government benefit is unconstitutional
under the constitutional provision at issue. The challenge for both judges
and scholars is therefore to avoid trying to impose greater uniformity with
respect to the application of the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine” than
as a constitutional matter is appropriate, and also to avoid importation of
certain aspects of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine from one
constitutional context to another without consideration of whether such
importation is again supportable as a constitutional matter.

